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Conceptualizing Data Security Threats and 












During a lawsuit, an organization is required to discover and produce relevant electronic data. In many cases, relevant data 
includes confidential data, such as personal information or trade secrets. During the course of a lawsuit, the discovered data 
may exchange many hands. This study analyzes data security threats and corresponding countermeasures within the e-
Discovery process by constructing a misuse case diagram. The analysis revealed seven data security threats, the agents who 
may carry out such threats, and twelve countermeasures. Of the twelve countermeasures identified, two require advanced 
planning and investment, while the remaining ten are inexpensive procedural controls. Thus, organizations can significantly 
improve data security during e-Discovery at relatively low cost. Misuse case diagrams used for visual conceptualization of 
information security can be used as a means to brainstorm and communicate security risk and controls with stakeholders of 
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INTRODUCTION 
At any given time, the average U.S. business is involved in an estimated three hundred lawsuits (ISACA 2011). Moreover, 
organizational records that are needed as evidence in lawsuits are typically in electronic format. With the proliferation of 
communication technologies (e.g., email, instant messaging, text messaging) and mobile devices, identifying, preserving, and 
collecting data relevant to a lawsuit can be an enormous task. Adding to this challenge, the U.S. Supreme Court updated the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 2006 to include a section on electronic discovery requiring that, for lawsuits filed in 
federal court, an enterprise must be able to produce electronically stored information (ESI) as evidence within a practical 
timeframe. Many states have copied these rules for e-Discovery. 
Electronic discovery, hereafter referred to as e-Discovery, is the process of identifying, preserving, collecting, preparing, 
reviewing, and producing electronically stored information (“ESI”) in the context of the legal process (The Sedona 
Conference 2010b). Though e-Discovery is most often associated with civil litigation, e-Discovery is also relevant to criminal 
litigation and regulatory compliance. For court admissibility, discovered data must be available and maintain integrity. In 
addition, based on the nature of the legal matter, discovered data may include confidential or otherwise valuable information. 
Therefore, data security risks need to be managed throughout the e-Discovery process. The present paper makes a 
contribution by identifying and mapping threats and countermeasures to business objectives within the e-Discovery process.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of the E-Discovery processes. 
Next, an analysis of data security threats within the e-Discovery process is conducted, followed by suggestions for 
countermeasures. Finally, a discussion section includes the study’s contribution, limitations, and conclusions. 
THE E-DISCOVERY PROCESS 
The e-Discovery process begins when an organization reasonably expects legal action, at which point data stewards and 
record custodians are identified. Stewards are those individuals who work with the parties or data involved in the legal 
matter, while record custodians are individuals responsible for the physical storage and protection of records throughout their 
retention period (The Sedona Conference 2010b). Stewards and custodians help identify relevant electronically stored 
information (ESI), and are also required to preserve relevant ESI until the legal case has been resolved. A discoverable 
document includes any designated documents or ESI, including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound 
recordings, and images stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after 
translation by the responding party into a reasonable usable form (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2010:58).  
Figure 1 depicts the e-Discovery process and follows the E-Discovery Research Model (EDRM 2005)
1
 with two variations 
explained below. In the beginning of e-Discovery, relevant data must be identified. Once an initial understanding is gained on 
the sources of relevant data, a legal hold is issued to preserve the relevant ESI. According to the Sedona Conference (2010b)
2
, 
a legal hold, also referred to as litigation hold, is “a communication issued as a result of current or reasonably anticipated 
litigation, audit, government investigation, or other such matter that suspends the normal disposition or processing of 
records.” That is, whenever litigation or investigation is reasonably anticipated, threatened, or pending against an 
organization, that organization has a duty to undertake reasonable and good faith actions to preserve relevant and 
discoverable information as evidence (The Sedona Conference 2010a). For example, during a legal hold while relevant ESI is 
to be preserved, data backup tapes containing relevant ESI should be pulled out of rotation to prevent relevant ESI from 
being over-written. Similarly, during a legal hold, data retention schedules for relevant ESI are frozen so that data does not 
get destroyed. Relevant ESI is then collected from identified sources. Collected data are synthesized to exclude non-relevant 
data and then converted, as necessary, to formats conducive to legal review and analysis; this stage is referred to as 
processing in the EDRM  (EDRM 2005). After legal analysis, ESI is produced (i.e., delivered) to outside parties, such as 
external counsel or the opposing party. The produced ESI is then presented in court. Upon resolution of the legal matter, the 
legal hold is released; that is, normal disposition and processing of records can be resumed. For the purposes of this study, the 
e-Discovery process in Figure 1 is depicted as a linear workflow, while the EDRM is said to be non-linear and iterative. 
                                                          
1
 The E-Discovery Reference Model was developed by a working group with the same name. The model is presented and 
described at http://www.edrm.net and is widely referenced in industry when discussing E-Discovery. 
2
 Sedona Conference is a non-profit, non-partisan research and educational institute that has published guidance on E-
Discovery that has served as guidance in court cases. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the stages of an e-Discovery process. 
 
Though “e-Discovery” is inherently focused on electronic information, both paper and electronic data are included in this 
study and hereafter referred to simply as “data”. Given the close relationship between paper and electronic documents in a 
legal case (e.g., paper documents can be scanned and presented as evidence), data security is considered to apply to both 
forms for the purpose of this study.  
ANALYSIS 
Conceptual models provide a means for an analyst to gain a greater understanding of the problem domain (Burton-Jones and 
Meso 2006; Wand and Weber 2002). As such, conceptual modeling was used in this study a means to identify security threats 
within the e-Discovery process. By visually depicting components within the model, the researcher (i.e., analyst) gains a 
greater understanding of the domain by seeing how model components relate to each other and where analytical gaps exist. A 
misuse case diagram was the analytical technique chosen for the present study for two reasons. First, a research stream exists 
on how a misuse case diagram may be used to integrate security considerations into IS functional modeling (Alexander 2003; 
Hope et al. 2004; Matulevicius et al. 2008; Sindre and Opdahl 2000; Sindre and Opdahl 2008). Secondly, just as use case 
diagrams are particularly useful when analyzing a business process where stakeholder (e.g., user) interaction is of primary 
interest, misuse case diagrams are particularly useful when analyzing data security threats posed by stakeholders. In the 
context of e-Discovery, various stakeholders are involved in the process. Therefore, modeling their interaction with the 
system (or process) facilitates the development of threat scenarios.  
A use case diagram depicts how stakeholders (called “actors”) interact with a system, and the desired system functionality 
from the stakeholder’s perspective. Conversely, a misuse case diagram provides a means to model undesirable system events 
that threaten successful completion of the system functions that were modeled as use cases (Sindre and Opdahl 2008). If a 
business function carried out within a system is viewed as an organizational objective and represented as a use case, then a 
misuse case depicts a threat to an organizational objective. That is, while use cases illustrate desirable system functionality, 
misuse cases illustrate undesirable events that could occur and disrupt the desirable system functionality. In a misuse 
diagram, threats are modeled as misuse cases, threat agents as “mis-actors”, mitigating controls that counter the specified 
threats as use cases, and the associations between these components (Sindre and Opdahl 2000; 2008). In the present study, a 
misuse diagram was constructed as a means to analyze data security threats within the e-Discovery process.  
 
Conceptually Modeling Misuse in the E-Discovery Process 
Prior to constructing the misuse case diagram, a normal use case diagram was constructed (Sindre and Opdahl 2000) by 
referencing the activities in Figure 1 and identifying the relevant actors for each use case. Threats were then identified by 
considering what could go wrong (i.e., threaten) the successful completion of the normal use cases (Peterson and Steven 
2006) and by consulting industry frameworks on e-Discovery (EDRM 2005; The Sedona Conference 2010a). These threats 
were modeled as misuse cases. An association was drawn between the misuse case and use case whose successful completion 
was threatened; the arrow is from the misuse case to the use case and labeled as “threatens” (Sindre and Opdahl 2008), as 
shown in Figure 2. Next, the mis-actors that may actually carry out the misuse case were identified. Both misuse cases and 
mis-actors are shaded in gray in Figure 2 to increase readability. Countermeasures to each threat were identified and modeled 
as use cases, shaded in yellow in Figure 2 to increase readability. Finally, countermeasure use cases were associated with 
misuse cases, with an arrow drawn from the countermeasure to the misuse case and labeled as either preventive or detective 
(Sindre and Opdahl 2000). In the next sections, the content in Figure 2 is described. 
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Legend: (1) Gray indicates threats and threat agents, modeled as misuse cases and mis-actors, respectively. 
(2) Yellow indicates data security countermeasures modeled as use cases.  
(3) White indicates business process objectives and stakeholders, modeled as use cases and actors, respectively. 
Figure 2. A Misuse Case Diagram for the E-Discovery Business Process 
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Threat Agents as Mis-actors 
The actors in an e-Discovery process often include data stewards and custodians, collectively referred to as “key players” 
(The Sedona Conference 2010a), who are familiar with and/or have possession of data relevant to the particular legal case. 
Also involved is inside legal counsel and internal IT personnel who help with data collection (Heikkila 2008). Various types 
of external service providers may be involved in the e-Discovery process, such as outside legal counsel, the legal team’s 
document service providers, external backup tape vendors, digital forensic experts, or other e-Discovery vendors. Ideally, the 
role of IS security will also be involved. Though the IS security role may be among IT personnel, a distinction is made in 
Figure 2 between these two roles since the work performed is different. From the perspective of Figure 2, the IT personnel 
work on preserving, collecting, and converting relevant ESI, while the IS security role is focused on implementing controls 
that manage data security risk. The roles of e-Discovery project manager, compliance manager, and records manager may 
also be part of an e-Discovery team (Heikkila 2008); for the purpose of this study, those roles may also be considered as key 
players in that they aid with the identification and preservation of relevant ESI. 
Data security threats may be carried out by threat agents (e.g., roles, systems) that are internal or external to an organization, 
and their adverse actions may be intentional or accidental. Consequently the threat agents, represented as mis-actors in Figure 
2, include the same roles that handle the relevant ESI. For some threats (i.e., misuse cases) in Figure 2, a particular mis-actor 
is singled out and linked to that particular misuse case because that mis-actor represents a higher impact or higher likelihood 
of carrying out the given misuse case. In other misuse cases, any person handling the data who was identified above as an 
actor may adversely impact data security during data handling. To increase model readability, this latter mis-actor is 
generically referred to as data handler in Figure 2. For example, any legitimate actor handling the data may breach data 
integrity or may compromise the authenticity of the data. Legacy systems also pose a threat to data security in E-Discovery in 
that needed data may not be reasonably accessible due to technological obsolescence. Finally, external hackers (or more 
correctly, crackers with malicious intent) pose a threat to circumvent security measures. 
 
Threats as Misuse Cases 
 
A threat is essentially something that could go wrong and would result in an undesirable outcome. From a data security 
perspective, threats within the e-Discovery process may arise from either accidental or intentional behavior. Natural disasters 
such as hurricanes, and manmade disasters such as fires, also pose threats to data security. However, for simplicity purposes, 
natural and manmade disasters are not addressed in this study. Next, a description of each misuse case in Figure 2 is 
provided. 
Failure to timely locate relevant data. Litigation cases (e.g., Zubulake v UBS Warburg 2004) have illustrated exorbitant costs 
that organizations can incur from not being able to readily identify relevant ESI. This threat is modeled as a data security 
threat in that the data are not available when needed. Conversely, a threat also exists that an organization will provide too 
much data to the opposing party. Though this threat was not explicitly modeled as a data security threat, countermeasures in 
Figure 2 (discussed later) for data unavailability may also counter the threat of providing opposing parties too much data.  
Delete relevant data. Unauthorized data destruction is a data security threat that could conceivably result from either 
accidental or intentional mis-actor behavior. For example, accidental data destruction could occur in cases where an 
organizational member thought the relevant tape backups were taken out of rotation, only to later discover additional tape 
backups were relevant that had not been taken out of backup tape rotation, so ultimately were over-ridden, destroying 
relevant data. Malicious data destruction could occur, for example, in cases where an employee who has a significant loss or 
gain at stake in the legal case may have a motive to destroy relevant data by shredding or deleting relevant documents. This is 
an example of spoliation and illustrates malicious intent in that the employee’s actions are intended to unduly influence the 
outcome of the legal case. 
Failure to retrieve legacy data. An example of this threat is legacy software or hardware not being available to access 
relevant ESI that could potentially support the organization’s position in the legal case. 
Breach to data integrity. For court admissibility, data must have integrity (Chisholm 2010). Integrity is a condition existing 
when data is unchanged from its source and has not been accidentally or maliciously modified, altered, or destroyed 
(NSTISSC 2000). 
Compromise to data authenticity. For court admissibility, data must demonstrate authenticity, meaning that there is some 
proof a document comes from the person, organization, or other legal entity claiming to be its author or authorizing authority 
(ARMA 2009). 
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Keep data beyond usefulness. Legal cases may include confidential data such as trade secrets and personal information 
(Heikkila 2008). If that confidential data are not destroyed upon completion of the legal case, the threat of unauthorized 
exposure remains, and protection of this confidential data is at the mercy of the external service provider until such data are 
destroyed. Therefore, security risks to confidential data must be managed throughout the data lifecycle, including data 
destruction (e.g., Prosch 2009). As long as data exists, a threat to its confidentiality exists, even if the data is no longer in use. 
This threat is particularly noteworthy in cases where confidential data has been provided to external service providers during 
the e-Discovery process.  
 
Hack outside counsel’s web portal. As standard practice, an outside legal counsel places on its web portal a client 
organization’s ESI that was collected for a legal case (Heikkila 2008). In doing so, the ESI is electronically accessible to the 
legal team working on the case. Security weaknesses with an external service provider’s environment may result in a breach 
to confidential, integrity, or availability of the client organization’s ESI. The breach could be performed by an external hacker 
unfamiliar with the particular legal case. Alternatively, poor security controls could enable an employee of an external service 
provider to copy relevant ESI and give or sell the ESI to someone on the opposing side. 
 
Countermeasures as Use Cases 
 
This section contains a description of each countermeasure in Figure 2. 
Maintain organizational records inventory and an asset inventory. Implicit in this countermeasure is that a record and an 
asset inventory need to be created prior to the need for e-Discovery in order to counter the risk of failing to identify data in a 
timely matter. In addition, given that records and computing assets evolve over time, inventories need to be routinely updated 
in order to be of value to e-Discovery. 
Maintain central(ized) document management. A centralized document management system facilitates the search (i.e., 
identification) of relevant data and later retrieval. Conversely, a less desirable alternative is to have documents, including 
email archives, stored on user workstations and other distributed storage locations.  
Maintain inventory of collected data. An inventory should be maintained of what data were collected for the e-Discovery 
case. Such an inventory enables an organization to establish tighter control, including the ability to detect if data later comes 
up missing from theft or unauthorized destruction. For example, if documents were inventoried and assigned a sequential 
number, any documents later missing from that numerical sequence would be detectable. 
Log system access. By maintaining logs of who has accessed databases, network drives, or other computing resources 
containing the relevant data, an organization may be able to detect any deviant behavior from someone engaged in 
unauthorized data modification or destruction. 
Archive essential records when there is a change in technology. If an organization upgrades its technology (e.g., transaction 
system; email system; tape backup system, etc.) and the data retention period for the affected data has not expired, the 
organization should maintain the ability to access data from the legacy system, even if the data are no longer in daily use. 
One means to do this would be to export the data to flat files (e.g., text or XML) and then archive the data. The key point is to 
have a strategy in place so that data from legacy systems remain available for as long as the data is retained. 
Consult e-Discovery integrity experts. Examples of such experts include a digital forensics specialist or a consultant 
specializing in document processing for e-Discovery. The purpose of including such a specialist is to ensure that data 
maintains its integrity for court admissibility. 
Compute hash value. A best practice method for being able to prove data integrity is to compute a hash value for said data. 
Hashing is defined as the process of taking an amount of data, such as a file or bit stream image of a hard drive, and applying 
a mathematical algorithm to generate a numerical identifier (the hash value) unique to that data (Chisholm 2010). For 
example, suppose a hash value is computed on a data file, that file is later changed, and a hash value is computed again. The 
two hash values will not match, indicating that the contents of the file have changed, and therefore, integrity is in question. 
Digital forensics experts advise that the initial hash value should be recorded into the chain of custody (defined in next 
countermeasure) and verified at each stage of data access or transfer (Chisholm 2010). As such, hashing and chain of custody 
are two countermeasures that should be used together to protect both data integrity and authenticity. 
Produce a chain of custody. A key method for meeting the requirement of data authenticity for court admissibility is to 
maintain a chain a custody, defined as the chronological documentation and/or paper trail showing the seizure, custody, 
control, transfer, analysis, and disposition of evidence, physical or electronic (EDRM 2005). The purpose is to be able to 
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prove who has had access to the data as the data are transferred from person to person throughout the e-Discovery process. A 
chain of custody should be established at the point of data collection (Chisholm 2010; EDRM 2005). 
Cancel legal hold. A legal hold goes into effect from the time an organization has a reasonable expectation that litigation is 
forthcoming until the time the legal case has been settled. Once the legal hold is canceled, normal data retention schedules are 
again applicable. Given that a litigation case can take multiple years to resolve, it is possible that lifting the legal hold gets 
overlooked. Alternatively, it is possible that all of the appropriate parties, both internal and external to the organization are 
not notified that the legal hold has been lifted. Consequently, data is maintained beyond its usefulness, and in cases where 
confidential data is involved, the data is at unnecessary risk of exposure. Thus, explicit plans should be in place for whom 
and when to notify that the legal hold has been lifted, so that the data can be destroyed if no longer needed. This is 
particularly true for external service providers with access to confidential data related to the legal case. 
Ensure secure deletion of delivered data. Once the legal matter has been concluded, any third parties with access to an 
organization’s data should be required to destroy said data. Heikkila (2008) recommends using an independent security firm 
to validate the data’s safe destruction. 
Assess vendor security controls. Any vendor hosting a web portal for legal counsel that has access to a client organization’s 
confidential data should be required to demonstrate that security controls that the client organization deems important are in 
place and functioning. Such assurance could be provided through certifications, detailed self-administered questionnaires on 
security, external audits of security controls, etc. If the vendor has strong security controls, a breach is less likely to occur. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Conceptual analysis yielded seven threats to data security within the e-Discovery process and twelve corresponding 
countermeasures. Legitimate participants in the e-Discovery process, both internal and external to an organization, present 
threats to the security of relevant data. These threats are attributed to both accidental and intentional behavior. Of the twelve 
countermeasures revealed in the analysis, only one was a technical control, while the other eleven were operational or 
procedural in nature. All three countermeasures aimed at facilitating data identification require an organization to have them 
in place prior to an e-Discovery effort. For example, records and asset inventories, along with centralized document 
management systems, need to be established in advance so that an organization can more easily and cost effectively locate 
relevant data. This suggests that organizations must plan in advance in order to reduce the threat of an inability or costly data 
identification for e-Discovery. 
Of the twelve countermeasures identified, only two may be considered somewhat costly (centralized document system and 
use of third party e-Discovery experts), while the remaining ten were procedural in nature, and thus relatively inexpensive. 
This finding suggests that organizations can significantly improve data security during e-Discovery at relatively low cost. 
Basic procedures, such as computing hash values and ensuring secure deletion of delivered ESI, can protect data integrity for 
court admissibility and confidentiality (e.g., trade secrets or personal information) at the conclusion of the legal case.  
 
Research Contribution 
While there have been some pioneers who have studied this domain (e.g., Heikkila 2008; Lomas 2010), there is clearly a 
dearth in research on how to protect data security during the e-Discovery process. The present study makes a research 
contribution by examining and documenting data security threats within the e-Discovery process. Study results suggest that 
countermeasures that manage the threat to data identification require advanced planning and investment, while security 
threats within the remainder of the e-Discovery process can often be countered with inexpensive procedural controls. 
A second research contribution is made in constructing a detailed misuse case model. There is a stream of literature on 
misuse cases that describe why and how to construct the diagrams (see literature review in Sindre and Opdahl 2008). 
Additional research has been needed that provides detailed examples of integrating security into use case diagrams. The 
present paper attempts to make such a contribution. In addition, the literature on misuse diagrams appears to be geared 
toward system developers. However, the present paper illustrates that researchers can also use this modeling technique as a 
means to analyze security threats within a problem domain.  
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Implications for Practice 
In an industry study (Ponemon Institute 2011), training was found to be the leading preventive measure taken by 
organizations following a data security breach. The results from this study can be used by organizational practitioners to 
communicate with and train employees on data security risks in e-Discovery before a costly data breach occurs. In other 
words, a visual image of security threats and countermeasures is likely to facilitate communication among stakeholders of a 
subject that is reasonably complex, such as identifying and countering information security risk. Findings from this research 
may also be used as a detailed example for IS students of how to integrate security concerns in system development models. 
Indeed, IS scholars have found that IS security is scarcely covered in the vast majority of systems analysis and design 
textbooks (Biros et al. 2007; Parrish et al. 2009). Misuse case diagrams can be used to conceptualize security risks and 
countermeasures within a given business process. 
 
Study Limitations 
Given the constraints of modeling “everything” in a single diagram, it is likely that a significant data security threat, 
countermeasure, or association is not included in the model. For example, a chain of custody should be maintained from the 
point of data collection through presentation (Chisholm 2010). However, drawing three lines from the “chain of custody” 
countermeasure use case to the relevant business objective use cases would have significantly convoluted the diagram; a 
compromise was made to only model “providing” a chain of custody for the use cases for data production and presentation. 
Nonetheless, the model does contain a reasonable amount of detail in a visual form that may spur additional discussion by 
organizational stakeholders on security threats and countermeasures. 
Similarly, space constraints in a model also result in a visually busy model containing many lines. However, while 
conducting the analysis the author did not find this limitation to threaten the ability to better understand the problem domain. 
Indeed, mental connections were made that likely would have gone unnoticed had this analysis been conducted strictly with 
words, as opposed to an image. 
 
Future Research 
In building on the present study, a contribution would be made by developing misuse case descriptions that provide detail 
behind each misuse case in the model that could serve as threat scenarios. Similar to use case descriptions, misuse case 
descriptions provide more actionable steps that could, in the context of data security, be used by security professionals to 
design and implement security controls for data within an e-Discovery process. Given that individual legal cases can span 
years, the investment to develop security measures, tailored to individual legal cases, would be useful. Extant literature has 
provided some guidance on how to construct misuse descriptions (Sindre and Opdahl 2008), though a standard has not yet 
emerged. Further developing a standard for misuse descriptions would be helpful future research. 
Many of the countermeasures described in the present study were of a procedural (i.e., operational) nature. Future research is 
needed on administrative controls for data security in e-Discovery. In particular, research on organizational policies that 
define IT governance around the e-Discovery process would be valuable. 
 
CONCLUSION 
A misuse case model was constructed as a means to analyze data security threats and countermeasures within the e-Discovery 
process. Study results suggest that countermeasures that manage the threat to identifying relevant data require advanced 
planning and investment, while security threats within the remainder of the e-Discovery process can often be countered with 
inexpensive procedural controls. Misuse case diagrams used for visual conceptualization of information security can be used 
as a means to communicate and brainstorm security risk and controls with non-security professionals who are stakeholders in 
an e-Discovery process.
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